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NOTES
LIABILITY OF FUNERAL DIRECTORS FOR NEGLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION

Funeral directing cannot be classed absolutely as a "profession."'
On the contrary, the funeral director's principal concern probably is
the sale of caskets and burial supplies, thus making him a "merchant"
or "trader." 2 However, for purposes of rendering services in connection with the care and burial of the dead as well as in accommodating
the family and friends of the deceased, the funeral director is considered a "professional man."13 It is the latter capacity which is under
consideration here.
It is inconsequential for legal purposes whether a mortician is referred to as a "funeral director," 4 an "embalmer," or an "undertaker."
An embalmer is one whose function it is to disinfect and preserve
dead human bodies.5 An undertaker is one whose vocation involves
the caring for dead human bodies and the burial or other disposition
of them, together with the conduct of the funeral and burial services. 6
These various terms are used interchangeably within this article, al7
though "funeral director" is apparently the preferred usage.
In most of the cases involving negligence in the performance of professional services, the plaintiff has a choice of remedies. There is usually a contract upon which the action may be based. In addition, the
relationship (e.g., doctor-patient, lawyer-client) may form the basis
for the imposition of tort duties. Finally, the existence of a contract
may serve as the occasion for liability in tort, as where the contract is
held to create specific tort duties. In this latter case, the duties imposed may or may not be identical with tort duties imposed generally.
Unfortunately, it is not always discernible from the case itself upon
1. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS 467 (2d ed. 1950).
2. STREET, MORTUARY JURISPRUDENCE § 5 (1948).

3. Id. § 6.

4. "Present-day use of the term 'undertaker,' presents nonlegal considerations which seem to argue strongly in favor of its abolition, on the ground that
the morticians of by-gone years who were designated by it were deficient in
their practices, as compared with the funeral director of today." Ibid.
5. JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 440. See also State ex rel. Kemplinger v.
Whyte, 177 Wis. 541, 188 N.W. 607 (1922).
6. "The work of the undertaker commences when the work of the physician
ends, and continues, notwithstanding the work of the embalmer, until final
disposition of the body. It is to the undertaker that the public must principally look for the enforcement of sanitary rules and regulations." People v.
Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143, 90 N.E. 451, 453 (1910). See also JACKSON, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 438-39.
7. See note 4 supra.
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which basis the action is founded. This appears to be particularly
true where the court decides the gist of the action by considering the
facts pleaded and proved.
Simply stated, to establish a cause of action based on negligence, it
is generally recognized that the plaintiff must show that the defendant
breached a duty owed to the plaintiff, thus causing damage to him.
The duty, or obligation, must be one recognized by law as imposing
upon the defendant a certain standard of conduct in order to protect
others against unreasonable risks. A failure to comply with the
required standard constitutes a breach of duty. However, there will
be no liability unless there is a reasonably close causal connection
between the breach and the injury. In addition, it is also essential to
the plaintiff's case that he show actual loss or damage. If any of these
elements is missing, the plaintiff's action fails.
A cause of action based upon a contract is to be distinguished from
the action for negligence. Parties to a contract impose duties upon
themselves by their consent to fulfill promises made. Failure to perform the promise made gives rise to a cause of action for the breach of
the contract. The measure of damages in a breach of contract action
is based upon what was reasonably within the defendant's contemplation at the time of the contract.
Often it may be extremely important to know upon which basis
the action is founded. In some cases it may be advantageous for the
plaintiff to proceed in contract. For example, by suing on the contract
the plaintiff may avoid the requirement of proving negligence (as
would be necessary in tort), have the benefit of a longer statute of
limitation, be entitled to proceed notwithstanding the death of one of
the parties, be able to receive the benefit of a bargain in damages, or
assign his claim. On the other hand, the plaintiff may desire to proceed in tort since often the damages allowed are greater, not being
restricted to those within the contemplation of the parties at the time
the contract was made. Also, in some situations recovery may be had
more readily for mental suffering if the action is in tort. A great many
other advantages to be considered are the basic defenses to which a
contract is subject, but which are inapplicable in tort, for instanceillegality, want of consideration, the statute of frauds, infancy, or the
parol evidence rule.
It is thus obvious that differing consequences may result from the
choice of theories. However, it will be noted that many of the cases
which follow come within the confused area in which the choice is
available, but fail to make clear which remedy has been chosen. Although it is not possible to reconcile or explain some of the cases, it
is possible to make the reader aware of the chaos. In any event, there
is some value in considering the factual situations which have been
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litigated in these areas. Whatever the doctrinal confusion, an examination of the cases may apprise the professional man and his counsel
of the probable consequences of negligence in the various phases of
his professional activity.
DuTY
In English history from the time of the Norman Conquest until the
nineteenth century, possession and disposition of dead bodies was a
matter of ecclesiastical concern, the theory being that the body must
be held by the church to await resurrection, the spirit having previously passed on to supernatural realms. 8 The jurisdiction of the common law was restricted to material matters such as tangible possessions of the deceased and also the monument. 9
In the United States, a dead body has never been considered property in the commercial sense;' 0 however, the English common law
rule constituted a stumbling block to recovery." The barrier was
finally broken down as American jurists began to realize that the
English doctrine was undesirable. The court in Larson v. Chase12
said:
But whatever may have been the rule in England under the ecclesiastical
law, and while it may be true still that a dead body is not property in the
common commercial sense of that term, yet in this country it is . . .
universally held that those who are entitled to the possession and custody
of it for purposes of decent burial have certain legal rights to and in it
which the law recognizes and will protect. Indeed, the mere fact that a
person has exclusive rights over a body for the purpose of burial leads
necessarily to the conclusion that it is his property in the broadest and
most general sense of that term, viz., something over which the law
accords him exclusive control. But this whole subject is only obscured
and confused by discussing the question whether a corpse is property in
the ordinary commercial sense, or whether it has any value as an article
of traffic.13
The existence of a duty to exercise a certain standard of care when
dealing with a dead body is based
upon the notion that there is a
quasi-property right in the body. 14 This qualified property right is of
8. Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 25 N.E. 822, 823 (1890); JACKSON, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 125-26.
9. JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 126.
10. Jefferson County Burial Soc. v. Scott, 218 Ala. 354, 118 So. 644 (1928)
(not to be held as security for funeral costs); O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285,
55 Pac. 906 (1899) (not part of the assets of an estate); Driscoll v. Nichols, 71
Mass. 488 (1855) (not the subject of a gift causa mortis); Keyes v. Konkel,
119 Mich. 550, 78 N.W. 649 (1899) (not subject to replevin); Toppin v.
Moriarty, 59 N.J. Eq. 115, 44 Atl. 469 (1899) (not common law larceny to steal
a corpse).
11. JACKSON, op. cit. supranote 1, at 130-31.
12. 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
13. 50 N.W. at 239.
14. Sanford v. Ware, 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10 (1950).
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relatively recent origin. The classic explanation is that made by
Ruggles:

5

1

[M]uch of the apparent difficulty of this subject arises from a false and
needless assumption, in holding that nothing is property that has not a
pecuniary value. The real question is not of the disposable, marketable
value of the corpse, or its remains, as an article of traffic, but it is of the
sacred and inherent right to its custody, in order to decently bury it, and
secure its undisturbed repose. .

.

. The establishment of a right so

sacred and precious, ought not to need any judicial precedent. Our
courts of justice should place it, at once, where it would fundamentally
rest for ever, on the deepest and most unerring instincts of human nature;
and hold it to be a self-evident right of humanity, entitled to legal protection, by every consideration of feeling, decency, and Christian duty.
The world does not contain a tribunal that would punish a son who
should resist, even unto death, any attempt to mutilate his father's corpse,
or tear it from the grave for sale or dissection; but where would he find
the legal right to resist, except in his peculiar and exclusive interest in the
body?16

Once it became established that those responsible for burial of the
dead also had rights in this regard,17 it resulted that the mortician was
responsible for due care in exercising his skill.18 The standard of care
appears to be based upon the same general standard imposed upon
others who hold themselves out to the public as especially proficient in
certain areas,' 9 that is, reasonably prudent care as exercised by others
engaged in the same activity within the same or a similar commu20
nity.
15. See In the Matter of Beekman Street, 4 Bradf. Surr. 503 (N.Y. 1856).
16. Id. at 529.
17. Absent a contrary expression of intent by the deceased, the surviving
spouse has paramount rights and responsibilities in the matter of burial. 15
Am. JuR. Dead Bodies § 9 (1938). If there is no surviving spouse, and absent
any other considerations, then the next of kin in the order of their relation
to the deceased has the right to bury the body. Id. § 10. For a criticism of
the rule that one's property right in a dead body arises from his duty to bury
the body, see Note, 30 N.C.L. REV. 299 (1952), urging that the right should be
in the family and next of kin.
18. "We are persuaded that when an embalmer engages to embalm a dead
body and to prepare it for retention for more than the usual length of time
after death, he contracts with the family that he will accomplish the desired
end if it can be done with reasonable care and skill, and if he fails because
of this lack he will indemnify the disappointed one for his breach." Taylor v.
Bearden, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 33, 36 (1915). See also Lamm v. Shingleton, 231
N. C. 10, 12, 55 S.E.2d 810, 812 (N.C. 1949).
19. See Brown Funeral Homes Ins. Co. v. Dobbs, 228 Ala. 482, 153 So. 737
(1934), in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant undertaker had "the
duty to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent and careful man, skilled
in the art of embalming corpses and preparing the same for burial." The
court said: "The duty arising out of these circumstances is not unlike that
resting upon a physician or surgeon called to professionally attend a patient,
'to exercise such reasonable care and skill in respect to the duty assumed as
physicians and surgeons in the same general neighborhood, in the same general
line of practice, ordinarily have and exercised in like cases'...." 153 So. at

738. See also PROSSER,
20.

PROSSER, TORTS

TORTS

132-34 (2d ed. 1955).

134 (2d ed. 1955).
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The work of a mortician may be divided primarily into three distinct phases-embalming, burial, and transportation. Embalming is
"the art of preserving dead bodies from decay." 21 Most of the cases
in which negligent embalming is alleged are based upon the fact that
the body is not as well preserved as the family desires. Probably the
most frequent manifestation that there has been negligence in the
embalming of the deceased is early decomposition. A 1933 Alabama
case2 2 is illustrative. Suit was initiated against the undertaking establishment by the wife of the deceased for negligent embalming, resulting in offensive odors three or four hours after embalming and also
in the flowing of liquid and blood from the mouth and nose of the
body. It was also alleged that the body was discolored as a result of
improper embalming. There was expert testimony to the effect that
a properly embalmed body would not have emitted foul odors nor
purged within three hours after treatment, and although an expert
testified that an undertaker is unable to prevent discoloration in pneumonia cases because the discoloration is present very soon after death,
it was shown in this case that the body was not discolored when received by the defendant. Consequently the plaintiff established negligence on the part of the defendant and recovered damages for her
mental anguish,2 apparently under the breach of contract theory as
discussed below.
Negligent embalming was also involved in Hall v. Jackson,2 4 in
which the plaintiff's action was based upon an allegation that her
husband's body had decomposed prior to the funeral. The body was
embalmed in Denver, Colorado, and shipped from there to Pennsylvania for the funeral. The extent of the decomposition made it necessary to leave the casket in the open air near the place where the
funeral was conducted. Although negligence was evident in this situation, there was held to be no recovery for mental anguish because the
defendant's conduct was not wilful or wanton.2
"In the case of Phillips vs. Higginbotham, decided by the U.S. District
Court, Western District of Arkansas, in May, 1941, reported only in the files
of the court, it was decided that a funeral director is not liable for unsatisfactory results of embalming done by a licensed embalmer with ordinary care
and in the use of methods commonly used by embalmers in the same locality."
STREET, op. cit. supra note 2, § 206. See also Chelini v. Nieri, 188 P.2d 564,
567 (Cal. App.), modified, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948).
21. JAcKSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 436.
22. Brown Funeral Home & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 226 Ala. 661, 148 So. 154
(1933).

23. See also Loy v. Reid, 11 Ala. App. 231, 65 So. 855 (1914), in which there
was recovery for mental anguish resulting from the decomposition of the
body of a two year old child because of negligence in embalming.
24. 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913).

25. This case represents the majority view that there can be no recovery
under breach of contract for mental anguish alone unless the breach was wilful
or wanton.
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A Tennessee decision, Phillips v. Newport,26 involved the interesting
problem of whether the defendant undertaker had performed an unprivileged autopsy 27 or had merely embalmed the body of the plaintiffs' infant child. It is profitable to examine the case from the standpoint of evidence concerning embalming procedures. The body was
received by the defendant within an hour after death, in good condition and with no incisions. No permission was given for a post-mortem
examination. When the mother came to dress the baby, she pulled the
sheet back and saw that incisions had been made. After the funeral
the mother had the body disinterred for the purpose of determining
whether there had been a post-mortem examination. During the
course of the trial it was established by the testimony that because of
the smallness of arteries and veins a baby is more difficult to embalm
than an adult; that removal of all the organs of the body is not necessary when embalming through the abdominal aorta or through the
arch of the aorta; and that none of the undertakers and embalmers
who testified had ever found it necessary to employ the method used
by the defendant in this case.28 This testimony, when added to the
unexplained disappearance of the liver and stomach proved adequate
to convince the jury that the defendant had performed an unauthorized autopsy and should therefore be liable for both compensatory and
punitive damages. In allowing damages for this intentional tort the
court said, "If the operations were done for the purpose of embalming
the body, plaintiffs cannot recover, even if such operations were unnecessary and were negligently done."
It is possible to conclude
from this dictum that Tennessee follows the majority rule which will
not allow damages in tort for mental anguish caused by mere negligence.30
26. 187 S.W.2d 965 (Tenn. App. 1945).

27. An autopsy is generally defined as the post-mortem examination of a
dead body by dissection to determine the cause, seat, or nature of disease.
E.0. Painter Fertilizer Co. v. Boyd, 93 Fla. 354, 114 So. 444 (1927).
28. "Incisions were made from near the point of each shoulder to the center
of the breast bone where they met. These incisions made a V shaped mark
on the body. The ribs had been removed from the breast bone, so this V
shaped part of the body was completely detached from the rest of the body.
From the point where these incisions met, a long incision was made down
the front of the body completely to the pelvis bone. These operations left the
body wide open from the pelvis bone to the neck. The stomach, heart, liver,
lungs, intestines, and one kidney were completely detached from the rest of
the body. The organs which were in the body at the time of this examination
were removed from the body by these doctors. They did not find the liver
and stomach." 187 S.W.2d at 969.
29. 187 S.W.2d at 967. (Emphasis added.)
30. But see Taylor v. Bearden, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 33 (1915), in which recovery was allowed for mental anguish in a breach of contract action for
negligent embalming. The court stated: "It is also contended by able counsel
that this is an action for breach of contract and that recoveries for mental
anguish in such cases are unknown to and unauthorized by the law; and it is
insisted that the damages awarded Bearden were for these only. The general
rule is that there can be no recovery of damages for mental anguish occasioned.
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Burial of dead bodies also presents occasion for negligence in funeral
directing. Although in theory recovery for mental anguish is not
generally allowed for mere negligence on the part of the funeral director in the performance of his duties relative to proper disposal of
the body, in practice there seems to be a tendency for the courts to
find some means of granting compensatory damages for mental suffering and shock occasioned by impropriety in connection with the
burial of the dead. Following are cases in which recovery has been
allowed.
Lamm v. Shingleton3' furnishes an interesting situation concerning
the undertaker and his activities regarding the burial process. The
plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant undertaker to inter
the body of her deceased husband. Plaintiff based her claim upon
the allegation that the defendant had negligently failed to lock one
end of the casket at the time of the original interment. As a result,
during a rainy spell the vault had risen about six inches above the
ground. This necessitated reinterment. Plaintiff's witnessing of the
vault out of the ground and the mud and rain which had seeped into
it, thus damaging the casket and the body, constituted the basis for
her claim of mental anguish. The court held that plaintiff could recover, but that the action was in contract and not in tort.m This case
represents the minority view that there may be recovery in contract
33
for a negligent breach resulting in mental anguish only.

In another casem the parents of a deceased infant daughter brought
an action against an undertaker for negligence in allowing the body
to be buried, or otherwise disposed of, thus breaching the contract by
which the defendant was to keep the body in a secure vault until the
plaintiffs were ready to inter it. The court said that the tort and contract were incapable of separation and allowed recovery for mental
anguish.
Sanford v. Ware35 presents a situation in which there was negligence
on the part of an undertaker in reinterring a dead body. Plaintiff
by breach of contract, but to this rule there are some exceptions. One wellknown exception is of that class of actions which sound more in tort than for
breach of contract. Another exception, or rather one branch of the exceptional
eases just referred to, is where the parties enter into a contract with personal
feelings, sentiments and wishes in contemplation, especially where it is understood at the time of contracting that there will be keen mental anguish and
suffering consequent upon a breach. In all such cases there may be a
substantial recovery for mental anguish alone." Id. at 35-36.
31. 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949).
32. "The... allegation that the defendants' failure to lock the vault at the
time of the burial, as a result of which water and mud entered the vault and
forced its top to the surface, was due to their negligence and carelessness does
not convert it into an action in tort." 55 S.E.2d at 812.
33. See Note, 6 VAmD. L. REV. 757, 766 (1953).
34. Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 25 N.E. 822 (1890).
35. 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10 (1950).
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desired to have the remains of her deceased husband moved from one
cemetery to another and contracted with defendant to have him
perform this service. During the process of removing the body, defendant contacted plaintiff and informed her that the wooden case
in which the casket was placed would need to be replaced. Plaintiff
agreed to this. About a month after plaintiff had been told by defendant that the body had been satisfactorily reburied she heard a rumor
that in fact her husband's body had not been removed. Upon investigation of both graves she found that the old grave contained the
casket and case and that the new grave contained the body only a
few inches below the ground and that it was "without the benefit of
a casket, case, or shroud." Plaintiff recovered both pecuniary loss
from having the job performed improperly and for mental suffering.
36
The court considered the action to be in tort.
Transportation to and from the cemetery for the relatives and
friends of the deceased is ordinarily furnished by the funeral director.37 This phase of the mortician's work also presents situations in
which there may be negligence. Generally the rules of agency are
applicable. Where the funeral director has undertaken by contract to
provide transportation for the family and friends of the deceased, it
is generally true that he may be held liable to these people for personal injuries resulting from his own negligence or that of his servants. However, the authorities are in some confusion concerning the
mortician's liability in the borrowed or hired servant situation.38 It
appears primarily to be an agency question which depends upon the
facts.
It is apparently well settled that an undertaker cannot avoid liability which may result from his contractual obligation to furnish transportation by borrowing or hiring an independent contractor.3 9 The
courts differ concerning whether an action pursuant to this obligation
to transport is in contract40 or tort.4' However, even if the contract
theory is followed it appears certain that the obligation extends to the
members of the family and friends as well as to the one who actually
negotiated the contract with the funeral director.4
36. "While the notice of motion alleges the making of the contract between
the parties for the removal of the remains of the plaintiff's husband, and the
breach thereof, it sounds in tort." 60 S.E.2d at 12.
37. JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 463.
38. STREET, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 151.
39. Dippel v. Juliano, 152 Md. 694, 137 Atl. 514 (1927).
40. John J. Radel Co. v. Borches, 147 Ky. 506, 145 S.W. 155 (1912). See
JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 464.
41. E.g., Grothmann v. Hermann, 241 S.W. 461 (Mo. 1922).
42. "We think it clear that, in arranging for the transportation of the
decedent's relatives and family, the undertaking company owes the same
obligation to each of them, though it may not know, save in the most general
way, the number and name of those who are to be transported." John J. Radel
Co. v. Borches, 147 Ky. 506, 145 S.W. 155, 156 (1912).
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A funeral director who obligates himself to furnish transportation
and who either borrows or hires a vehicle and driver will be liable for
any personal injuries resulting from the negligent operation of the
vehicle if he, and not the owner, has the power to control the driver's
actions. 43 This does not mean that actual control must have been exercised-the mere right to control is sufficient. 44
The majority of cases are decided on the basis of the power to control test although just what constitutes the power to control is not
clear. Following are some cases in which liability was found: In Sack
v. A. R. Nunn & Son,45 the funeral director hired cars and drivers to
accommodate the family of the deceased by transporting them to and
from the funeral. The funeral director placed the cars in the procession line and also placed stickers 46 containing driving rules on the
windshields. The court held that there was sufficient right to control
to hold the undertaker liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for personal injuries sustained by the brother of the deceased.
47
Sufficient right to control was also found in Grothmann v. Hermann
in which the defendant undertaker hired cars for use in a funeral.
Here the driver of one hired car negligently slammed a door on the
hand of the plaintiff who was a passenger in a car hired from a different party. Although the extent of the undertaker's direction to
the drivers was to follow a certain route, he was held liable for the
plaintiff's injury even though he had nothing to do with the operation
of the car.
Greenberg & Bond Co. v. Yarbrough48 furnishes an illustration of
liability based upon the power to control test. In this case the defendant undertaker had hired taxicabs for funeral transportation and had
directed the drivers to take certain persons to the funeral and to take
them where they wanted to go afterwards. Plaintiff was injured when
the driver of her cab ran into a telephone pole while he was speeding.
In Dippel v. Juliano,49 there was negligence on the part of the borrowed driver of a borrowed car while returning from a funeral. The
route, destination, speed, and the passengers who were to occupy the
car were controlled by the defendant in this situation. Here the court
43. "In the majority of cases the undertaker has been held liable or relieved
of liability by a determination of whether under general rules, the undertaker
was or was not the master of the offending driver...." JAcKSON, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 464.
44. See Sack v. A. R. Nunn &Son, 129 Ohio St. 128, 194 N.E. 1 (1934).
45. 129 Ohio St. 128, 194 N.E. 1 (1934).
46. See Pantell v. Shriver-Allison Co., 61 Ohio App. 119, 22 N.E.2d 497
(1938), in which '"uneral stickers" were placed on cars volunteered for use
in the funeral procession. However, the sticker did not create a masterservant relationship between the funeral director and the volunteer.
47. 241 S.W. 461 (Mo. 1922).
48. 26 Ga. App. 544, 106 S.E. 624 (1921).

49. 152 Md. 694, 137 Atl. 514 (1927).
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spoke in terms of liability because of the master-servant relationship
and also the aspect of one's not being able to avoid his obligation under contract by borrowing the services of an independent contractor.
John J. Radel Co. v. Borches5° seems to stand for the minority proposition that injury to a mourner is covered by the contractual obligation to provide safe transportation and need not be based upon a
finding of a master-servant relationship, implying that this relationship would be necessary only if the rights of a stranger to the deceased
were involved. To the same effect is Mahany v. Kansas City Rys.
Co.,51 involving an injury to plaintiff-pallbearer who was riding in a
hired car which collided with a street car. He obtained a judgment on
the basis of defendant undertaker's failure to exercise due care in
performing the contract to provide transportation in connection with
the funeral services.
Those cases which hold that the undertaker is not liable for the
negligence of the borrowed driver are based upon findings of no right
to control. Frerker v. Nicholson52 goes back to the "horse and buggy
days," but the same law is still applicable. The undertaker 53 hired a
horse and carriage for use in a funeral but exercised no control except
to instruct as to the general route to take to the cemetery and to
return the passengers to their homes. It was held that the owner of
the carriage was liable for the driver's negligence in starting suddenly as the plaintiff was alighting from the carriage.
Dubisson & Goodrich v. McMillin54 held that the undertaker was not
liable for negligence of a hired car and driver since the extent of his
control was to tell the driver the time and place to go.
A taxicab company was held liable for personal injuries in Burke
v. Shaw Transfer Co. 55 on the ground that the driver was not a servant
of the undertaker who hired cabs for funeral transportation and who
was billed at the end of each month.
Two cases have been found involving an undertaker's use of flower
trucks. In a Kansas case6 the defendant undertaker furnished, as a
part of his services, transportation of flowers from the place of the
funeral service to the cemetery. On this particular occasion he had
borrowed a truck and driver from a florist and while delivering flowers for the undertaker the driver hit a young boy who was bicycling.
50. 147 Ky. 506, 145 S.W. 155 (1912).
51. 254 S.W. 16 (Mo. 1923).
52. 41 Colo. 12, 92 Pac. 224 (1907).
53. It was decided in Nicholson v. E. P. McGovern Undertaking Co., 41 Colo.
1, 92 Pac. 225 (1907), that there was no cause of action against the undertaker.
54. 163 Ark. 186, 259 S.W. 400 (1924).
55. 211 Mo. App. 353, 243 S.W. 449 (1922).
56. Moseman v. L. M. Penwell Undertaking Co., 151 Kan. 610, 100 P.2d 669
(1940).
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Employing the control test, the court held the undertaker liable. In
a Missouri case,57 however, an undertaker who loaned a flower truck
to another undertaker under an association arrangement was held
liable for the driver's negligence under the right to control test.
It has been suggested as a preventive measure that the funeral
director who is unwilling to assume the responsibilities connected
with borrowed cars and drivers should inform his client that he is
acting as an agent in securing them. 58 Whenever possible this should
be made a clause in the contract. 59
OTHER INsTANcEs OF LImnITy

As expressed previously, funeral directors are subject to liability
for negligence in many situations, not all of which are peculiar to their
particular business. For example, liability has been found where a
visitor to the funeral home fell on icy steps approaching the building;60 where a visitor stepped upon and displaced a plank which was
placed upon concrete steps which were being repaired; 61 and where
a hearse was negligently driven out of a driveway causing a collision
62
which injured a passenger in the other car.
Walker v. Joseph P. Geddes FuneralService, Inc.,63 presents a clear
case of negligence in a rather unusual setting. Ambulance attendants
were carrying an elderly patient on a stretcher and while going down
stairs allowed her to fall. In the fall, the patient received a severe
blow to the head, contusions to the arm, and a broken right hip; a few
days later she died. Since there was conflicting testimony concerning
her condition before the fall, damages of only $100 were awarded.
CAUSATION

While causation is a significant factor in any attempt to obtain damages, its importance here is diminished because it is not a difficult
matter to prove. Although recovery of damages for mental suffering
is discussed below, it is to be noted here that if recovery for mental
anguish is sought in a breach of contract action, the plaintiff must
show that the damage was reasonably within the contemplation of
57. O'Brien v. Rindskopf, 334 Mo. 1233, 70 S.W.2d 1085 (1934).
58. STREET, op. cit. supra note 2, § 155. For a discussion of this problem see

Dubisson & Goodrich v. McMillin, 163 Ark. 186, 259 S.W. 400 (1924), and John
J. Radel Co. v. Borches, 147 Ky. 506, 145 S.W. 155 (1912).
59. For example: "'It is mutually understood that the Funeral Director is to
secure from a third party or parties-passenger cars and drivers to be used in
carrying funeral passengers, that in securing such cars and drivers the Funeral
Director acts as the client's agent, and shall not be liable for accidents due to
fault of such third parties and/or drivers.'" STREET, Op. cit. supra note 2, §
155.
60. Chatkin v. Talarski, 123 Conn. 157, 193 Atl. 611 (1937).
61. Dougherty v. Brandt, 122 Pa. Super. 410, 186 Atl. 419 (1936).
62. Stroud v. Davis-Lawhead Funeral Home, 154 So. 476 (La. App. 1934).
63. 33 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 1948).
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the parties at the time of contracting.6 If, on the other hand, damages
for mental anguish are sought in a tort action, it must be established
that the damage was the natural and proximate result of the wrong.65
No difficulty is posed with regard to proving the connecting link6s
since it is reasonably clear that improper care of a dead body is likely
to result in mental suffering by the relatives of the deceased.67 Even
though causation is established, however, most courts will not compensate mental suffering alone.
DAmAGES

The unique, and perhaps the most difficult, phase of this subject is
presented in a consideration of recovery by a relative of the deceased
for mental anguish resulting from the mortician's negligence in handling the body. The plaintiff may pursue one of two remedies-breach
of contract 68 or tort.

Courts quite generally have taken the position that damages in a
breach of contract action should place the plaintiff in the position
which the fulfillment of the contract would have left him.69 At com-

mon law the general rule did not allow recovery for mental anxiety
resulting from breach of contract;7 0 however, in So Relle v. Western
64. "The tenderest feelings of the human heart center around the remains
of the dead. When the defendants contracted with plaintiff to inter the body
of her deceased husband in a workmanlike manner they did so with the
knowledge that she was the widow and would naturally and probably suffer
mental anguish if they failed to fulfil their contractual obligation in the
manner here charged. The contract was predominantly personal in nature
and no substantial pecuniary loss would follow its breach. Her mental concern, her sensibilities, and her solicitude were the prime considerations for
the contract, and the contract itself was such as to put the defendants on
notice that a failure on their part to inter the body properly would probably
produce mental suffering on her part. It cannot be said, therefore, that such
damages were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the
contract was made." Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 13-14, 55 S.E.2d 810,
813-14 (1949).
65. "But it is universally held that where a personal tort, such as that with
which we are here concerned, has been committed which will support an
action to recover some damages, compensation for mental suffering may be
recovered in addition thereto if such suffering is a natural and probable
result of the act." Sanford v. Ware, 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10, 13 (1950).
66. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035-36 (1936).

67. In Wright v. Beardsley, 46 Wash. 16, 89 Pac. 172 (1907), damages for
mental anguish were allowed for burial of a stillborn baby in a rough box on
top of another casket. Relative to causation the court said: ".

.

. Where one

person agrees to give a dead body a decent burial, and under such agreement
obtains possession of the body, and in violation of this duty casts the body by
the way, or wrongfully mutilates it, or disposes of it, or deposits it in a grave
without covering in such a manner as to cause the relatives or persons
charged with its decent sepulture to naturally suffer mental anguish, it would
shock the sensibilities to hold that there was no remedy for such a wrong."
Id. at 173.
68. For general background concerning recovery for mental anguish in the
breach of contract actions, see Note, 6 VAxD. L. REV. 757 (1953).
69. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 137 (1935).
70. See Taylor v. Bearden, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 33 (1915) and note 30 supra.
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Union Telegraph Co.,71 the court allowed the plaintiff to recover
general damages for negligence of the telegraph company in transmitting and delivering a message relating to the death of plaintiff's
mother, thus causing him to miss the funeral services. It was held
that the plaintiff should be compensated for his mental suffering since
this was within the parties' contemplation when the contract was
made. While this rule is still not generally followed,72 it has been
adopted in a few states.73
Illustrative of the So Relle minority rule allowing damages for
mental suffering resulting from breach of contract is Lamm v.
Shingleton,74 discussed above. The facts of this case leave little room
for doubt concerning the validity of the plaintiff's claim of mental
distress. Not only was the appearance of her husband's body a source
of distress, but one of the defendants replied, when asked to remove
the mud and water from the vault, "To hell with the whole damned
business, it's no concern of mine." Plaintiff stated that this statement
added to her nervousness.
It is also generally agreed that no tort action can be maintained
for mental disturbance caused by negligence without accompanying physical injury.7 5 However, there are exceptions, one of which,
the negligent handling of dead bodies,7 6 is recognized 'by a few
courts. Apparently the only seemingly valid reason for denying
recovery for negligence causing only mental anguish is the great
possibility of false claims.77 However, this reason fails in the case of
misconduct involving a dead body, since there is assurance that the
mental anxiety of the deceased's relatives is genuine.7 8 Nevertheless,
most courts still require either physical harm79 or wilful and wanton 80
conduct before mental anquish will be compensated. Although no
case involving an undertaker has been found to represent the minority
view, it is reasonable to assume that the courts which have allowed
recovery against others who have dealt negligently with dead bodies,
would also grant damages for mental suffering if an undertaker were
the defendant.
CONCLUSION
Funeral directors, like all men who offer skills to the public, are
Generally, see Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 HARV.L. REV. 1033 (1936).
71. 55 Tex. 308 (1881).
72. McCoRmcK, DAMAGES § 145 (1935).

73. Ibid.
74. 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949).

75. PROSSER, TORTS 180 (2d ed. 1955).
76. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.4, n.1 (1956).
77. PROSSEa, TORTS 177 (2d ed. 1955).

78. Id. at 180-81.
79. E.g., Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541 (1941).
80. 2 HARPER & JAMES, Op. cit. supra note 76, § 18.4.

